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INTRODUCTION 
ver a century has passed since the Supreme Court first 
recognized the Gros Ventre and Assiniboine Tribes’ reserved 
water rights to the Milk River in the landmark case Winters v. United 
States.1 The precedent established in Winters has benefitted numerous 
other tribes, who have used their reserved water rights as leverage to 
obtain favorable settlements in state water adjudications.2 Now, the 
Gros Ventre and Assiniboine Tribes have themselves achieved a 
compromise with the State of Montana that would finally determine 
the extent of the Tribes’ water rights after a century of uncertainty 
regarding the quantity of water to which they are entitled.3 But the 
settlement faces a final obstacle—it must receive congressional 
approval and federal funding to provide water delivery systems for 
the Tribes in exchange for the Tribes’ waiver of additional claims to 
the Milk River.4 So far, Congress has approved twenty-seven Indian 
water settlements.5 However, the Gros Ventre and Assiniboine Tribes 
and the State of Montana will face a greater challenge in obtaining 
approval than states and tribes faced in earlier settlements. The 
recently passed Pay-as-You-Go (PAYGO) Act6 requires that 
congressional spending, including funding of Indian water 
settlements, be offset by reducing other spending or increasing 
revenue.7 
 
1 207 U.S. 564 (1908). 
2 See, e.g., Claims Resolution Act of 2010, H.R. 4783, 111th Cong. (2010) (enacted) 
(containing four settlements concerning seven tribes’ Winters water rights). 
3 See Gros Ventre and Assiniboine Tribes of the Fort Belknap Indian Community Water 
Rights Settlement Act of 2013, S. 1394, 113th Cong. (2013). The settlement recognizes 
the Tribes’ rights to 645 cubic feet per second of water under the Winters decision. Id. § 
8(a)(1)(B)(i)(I). 
4 See id. § 10 (discussing waivers and releases of claims); id. § 11(c)(1), (j)(1) 
(providing for mandatory appropriations for water resources development). 
5 W. STATES WATER COUNCIL, SETTLEMENTS APPROVED BY CONGRESS (2011), 
available at http://www.westgov.org/wswc/SETTABLE%202011%20%2808-15-11%29 
.pdf. 
6 Pub. L. No. 111-139, 124 Stat. 8 (2010) (codified in scattered sections of 2 U.S.C.). 
7 2 U.S.C. § 934(b) (2012) (requiring the President to issue an order to reduce direct 
spending programs to offset debit). 
O
LEE (DO NOT DELETE) 5/15/2014  2:10 PM 
2014] A Century of Uncertainty and the New Politics of Indian Water Settlements: 627 
How Tribes and States Can Overcome the Chilling Effect of the PAYGO Act 
The requirements of the PAYGO Act could have a chilling effect 
on Indian water settlements,8 which have provided a practical avenue 
for resolving bitter and lengthy litigation.9 Thus, this article seeks to 
identify factors that will allow tribes to create the political momentum 
needed to obtain federal funding despite PAYGO requirements. After 
Part I provides a historical overview of Indian water rights 
settlements, Part II examines how the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence 
on Indian reserved water rights has led to significant uncertainty and 
has thus given rise to “a strong trend favoring congressionally 
approved Indian water settlements.”10 Part III describes how Indian 
water settlements not only overcome the doctrinal uncertainty 
discussed in Part II but also provides a number of benefits to non-
tribal and tribal parties that would not be achievable through 
litigation. Part IV then explains statutory PAYGO requirements. It 
also identifies factors contributing to the recent success tribes and 
states had in obtaining funding for four Indian water settlements while 
meeting PAYGO requirements. Part V applies these factors to 
determine how three recently proposed settlements, including the 
Gros Ventre and Assiniboine water rights settlement, may be able to 
overcome the obstacle of PAYGO. 
I 
THE LEGAL BACKGROUND OF INDIAN WATER RIGHTS SETTLEMENTS 
The Supreme Court’s decisions in the area of Indian reserved water 
rights have been sparse.11 The Court has largely been willing to leave 
the adjudication of Winters water rights in the hands of state courts.12 
 
8 See Ryan A. Smith, Indian Water Settlements: Outlook for the 112th Congress and 
Beyond, WATER REP., Aug. 15, 2011, at 2, 3–4. 
9 Robert T. Anderson, Indian Water Rights, Practical Reasoning, and Negotiated 
Settlements, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 1133, 1134 (2010). 
10 Id. at 1136. 
11 Id. “Over the past century, the Court has only handed down two substantive 
decisions on the nature and scope of Indian reserved water rights . . . .” Id. (citing Arizona 
v. California (Arizona I), 373 U.S. 546 (1963); Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564 
(1908)). However, the Court has decided a number of procedural and jurisdictional 
questions surrounding tribal water rights. Id. (citing United States v. Idaho, 508 U.S. 1 
(1993); Arizona v. San Carlos Apache Tribe, 463 U.S. 545 (1983); Nevada v. United 
States, 463 U.S. 110 (1983); Arizona v. California, 460 U.S. 605 (1983); Colo. River 
Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800 (1976)). 
12 See San Carlos Apache Tribe, 463 U.S. at 567–70 (determining that federal courts 
may decline to exercise jurisdiction over a case concerning Indian reserved water rights 
when those rights are at issue in an ongoing general adjudication in state court); Colo. 
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This abdication of direct federal judicial oversight has destined the 
Winters doctrine to a lack of uniformity among states,13 though 
federal circuit courts have at times weighed in on the matter.14 
Section A explores the unwieldy framework that has emerged from 
the few Supreme Court decisions on Indian reserved water rights. 
Section B then examines the federal trust duty in relation to tribal 
water rights to determine what obligation, if any, the federal 
government has to protect or develop tribal water. 
A. The Law of Indian Reserved Water Rights 
Water rights derived from state law under the doctrine of prior 
appropriation are generally easier to adjudicate than Winters rights 
because state rights are oftentimes already registered with state 
agencies and quantified more easily through the doctrine of beneficial 
use.15 Indian reserved water rights pose greater problems for states 
and private parties in adjudications for three reasons. First, Indian 
reserved rights generally take precedence over most other water rights 
because the reserved rights have the same priority date as the date the 
reservation was founded, or earlier for reserved aboriginal rights.16 
Second, Indian reserved rights are not subject to forfeiture under state 
law.17 Third, they are not tied to actual beneficial use and are thus 
 
River Water Conservation Dist., 424 U.S. at 810–12 (determining that the federal 
government’s waiver of sovereign immunity under the McCarran Amendment for general 
adjudications permitted state courts to adjudicate Indian reserved water rights by suing the 
United States as a tribe’s trustee); Michael C. Blumm et al., The Mirage of Indian 
Reserved Water Rights and Western Streamflow Restoration in the McCarran Amendment 
Era: A Promise Unfulfilled, 36 ENVTL. L. 1157, 1157–58 (2006). 
13 Compare Big Horn River, 753 P.2d 76, 100–01 (Wyo. 1988) (quantifying Winters 
rights based on practically irrigable acreage of the reservation), aff’d sub nom. by an 
equally divided court, Wyoming v. United States, 492 U.S. 406 (1989) (O’Connor, J., not 
participating), and abrogated by Vaughn v. State, 962 P.2d 149 (Wyo. 1998), and State ex 
rel. Greely v. Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes, 712 P.2d 754, 764 (Mont. 1985) 
(similarly using the Practically Irrigable Acreage (PIA) standard to quantify Winters 
rights), with Gila River Sys. & Source, 35 P.3d 68 (Ariz. 2001) (rejecting the PIA standard 
as a single-factor test and applying a flexible multi-factor analysis known as the 
“homeland” standard to quantify Winters rights). 
14 E.g., United States v. Adair, 723 F.2d 1394 (9th Cir. 1983). 
15 See generally A. DAN TARLOCK, LAW OF WATER RIGHTS AND RESOURCES § 5:66 
(2010) (discussing the prior appropriation system). 
16 E.g., Arizona I, 373 U.S. at 600; Adair, 723 F.2d 1394; Dep’t of Ecology v. Yakima 
Reservation Irrigation Dist., 850 P.2d 1306 (Wash. 1993). 
17 See, e.g., United States v. City & Cnty. of Denver, 656 P.2d 1, 34–35 (Colo. 1982) 
(“Federal reserved water rights are immune from Colorado’s non-use requirement to the 
extent necessary to fulfill the purposes of the reservation.”). 
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difficult to quantify.18 Rather, they are quantified by determining the 
practically irrigable acreage of the reservation or, according to one 
court, by using an open-ended, multiple-factor test.19 
The history of Indian federal reserved water rights begins with the 
landmark case, Winters.20 In Winters, the federal government sought 
to enjoin, on behalf of the tribes that resided in the Fort Belknap 
Reservation, diversions of water from the Milk River by settlers 
upstream of the reservation.21 Although the settlers had invested 
heavily in and relied on these diversions,22 the settlers’ reliance 
interests did not affect the Court’s analysis. The Supreme Court 
concluded that by creating the Fort Belknap Reservation, the federal 
government had impliedly reserved an amount of water sufficient to 
fulfill the purpose of the reservation.23 The Court emphasized that 
without this water, the land would be “a barren waste.”24 To reach 
this conclusion, the Court relied on the Indian canon of interpretation 
that a court should interpret an agreement based on how tribes would 
have understood it.25 The Court, therefore, determined that the tribes 
retained significant water rights under the treaty and accordingly 
affirmed an injunction on the settlers’ diversions.26 
Fifty-five years later in Arizona v. California, the Court set out a 
standard for quantification of Winters water rights for land that was 
useful for irrigation and agriculture.27 Agreeing with the water master 
in that case, the Court adopted the practicably irrigable acreage (PIA) 
standard.28 Under the PIA standard, a tribe is generally entitled to 
 
18 Robert T. Anderson, Indian Water Rights and the Federal Trust Responsibility, 46 
NAT. RESOURCES J. 399, 414 (2006) (citing United States v. Walker River Irrigation Dist., 
104 F.2d 334, 338–39 (9th Cir. 1939)). 
19 Gila River Sys. & Source, 35 P.3d 68, 79–81 (Ariz. 2001). 
20 Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564 (1908). 
21 Id. at 565. 
22 Id. at 569. 
23 Id. at 575–78. Alternatively, some language in Winters indicates that the Indians 
already had these water rights and that congressional action was required to usurp these 
water rights. Anderson, supra note 9, at 1142; see also Winters, 207 U.S. at 576 (“The 
Indians had command of the . . . waters . . . of all their beneficial use, whether kept for 
hunting, ‘and grazing roving herds of stock,’ or turned to agriculture and the arts of 
civilization. Did they give up all this?”). 
24 Winters, 207 U.S. at 577. 
25 Id. at 576–77. 
26 Id. at 578. 
27 373 U.S. 546 (1963). 
28 Id. at 600–01. 
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water that it has used or could use to irrigate lands that are reasonably 
capable of sustaining agriculture.29 Thus, to determine a tribe’s 
reserved rights, the standard took into account a tribe’s present and 
future needs for water.30 The Court also rejected Arizona’s contention 
that Indian water rights should be limited to only “reasonably 
foreseeable needs” based on the population of the reservation.31 
Because it remained uncertain how many Indians would be present on 
the reservation in the future, using irrigable acreage provided more 
certainty in measuring water rights.32 Had the Court determined that 
Winters water rights expanded as the population grew, it would have 
been impossible for parties to determine how much water is available 
for appropriation in the future.33 
In Wyoming v. United States,34 the Supreme Court could have 
revisited the PIA standard for quantification. After the Wyoming 
Supreme Court used the PIA standard to quantify and award 
substantial Indian reserved water rights in the Big Horn 
adjudication,35 the State appealed to the Supreme Court and argued 
that the PIA standard should be discarded because it gave tribes an 
“unjustified windfall.”36 After oral argument, however, Justice 
O’Connor recused herself from the case, leading to an affirmance 
without an opinion by an equally divided Court.37 Researchers later 
obtained a draft of what would have been Justice O’Connor’s 
opinion38 for the majority position.39 In this draft opinion, Justice 
O’Connor would have significantly revised the PIA standard by 
factoring in non-Indian expectations when quantifying Winters water 
 
29 See Gila River Sys. & Source, 35 P.3d 68, 81 (Ariz. 2001); Big Horn River, 753 P.2d 
76, 101 (Wyo. 1988); Andrew C. Mergen & Sylvia F. Liu, A Misplaced Sensitivity: The 
Draft Opinions in Wyoming v. United States, 68 U. COLO. L. REV. 683, 696 (1997). 
30 Arizona I, 373 U.S. at 600. 
31 Id. at 600–01. 
32 Id. at 601. 
33 Anderson, supra note 9, at 1143. 
34 492 U.S. 406 (1989). 
35 Big Horn River, 753 P.2d 76, 101–12 (Wyo. 1988). 
36 Charles Carvell, Indian Reserved Water Rights: Impending Conflict or Coming 
Rapprochement Between the State of North Dakota and North Dakota Indian Tribes, 85 
N.D. L. REV. 1, 34 (2009). 
37 Wyoming, 492 U.S. at 407. Justice O’Connor recused herself after learning that her 
family’s ranch was involved in a water adjudication in Arizona that concerned Indian 
water rights. Carvell, supra note 36. 
38 Mergen & Liu, supra note 29, at app. (reprinting Justice O’Connor’s draft opinion). 
39 Carvell, supra note 36; Mergen & Liu, supra note 29, at 704. 
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rights.40 Additionally, Justice O’Connor reasoned that practically 
irrigable acreage should be determined based on “a ‘practical’ 
assessment . . . of the reasonable likelihood that future irrigation 
projects . . . will actually be built.”41 Justice O’Connor’s approach to 
quantification has become known as the “Sensitivity Doctrine” 
because it emphasizes sensitivity to non-Indian expectations.42 
Although the draft opinion lacks precedential effect, private parties 
have used similar arguments in litigation to minimize Winters water 
rights. Some courts have been willing to consider these arguments.43 
Indeed, the Arizona Supreme Court seemed to approve of the 
Sensitivity Doctrine when it stated that tailoring a tribe’s reserved 
water rights to its minimal need “demonstrates appropriate sensitivity 
and consideration of existing users’ water rights.”44 
In contrast to the Supreme Court’s standard for quantifying Indian 
water rights based on practically irrigable acreage, the Court has been 
more willing to limit federal reserved water rights when the water will 
be used for federal (nontribal) purposes.45 In Cappaert v. United 
States, the Court recognized the federal government’s reserved water 
rights to maintain habitat for a fish species at a national monument.46 
It concluded, however, that the water right should be tailored to the 
federal government’s “minimal need.”47 In United States v. New 
 
40 Carvell, supra note 36, at 33–34; see also Gila River Sys. & Source, 35 P.3d 68, 81 
(Ariz. 2001) (recognizing litigants’ arguments that “courts should act with sensitivity 
toward existing state water users when quantifying tribal water rights”). 
41 Mergen & Liu, supra note 29, at app. at 738 (reprinting Justice O’Connor’s draft 
opinion). 
42 Barbara A. Cosens, The Measure of Indian Water Rights: The Arizona Homeland 
Standard, Gila River Adjudication, 42 NAT. RESOURCES J. 835, 849 n.74 (2002) 
(“Although the majority opinion does not use the term ‘sensitivity,’ [the majority opinion] 
is considered the source of the Sensitivity Doctrine.”). However, non-Indian expectations 
may not be justified insofar as non-Indians encouraged or were aware of encroachment on 
Indian rights and thus may not be worthy of “sensitivity.” See Ann E. Tweedy, 
Unjustifiable Expectations: Laying to Rest the Ghosts of Allotment-Era Settlers, 36 
SEATTLE U. L. REV. 129, 187–89 (2012) (rejecting non-Indian expectations as unjustified 
in the context of tribal jurisdiction); see also Ezra Rosser, Protecting Non-Indians from 
Harm? The Property Consequences of Indians, 87 OR. L. REV. 175, 218–19 (2008) 
(questioning the innocence of non-Indian expectations and emphasizing courts’ roles in 
forming those expectations through the rule of law). 
43 See Gila River Sys. & Source, 35 P.3d at 81. 
44 Id. 
45 See United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696 (1978); Cappaert v. United States, 
426 U.S. 128 (1976). 
46 Cappaert, 426 U.S. at 138–42. 
47 Id. at 141. 
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Mexico, Justice Rehnquist, writing for a majority of the Court, 
followed Cappaert’s lead and narrowly construed a non-Indian 
reserved water right for a national forest.48 The Court limited the 
federal government’s water right to only the water required to support 
the primary purpose of the reservation, which was, in that case, to 
promote nearby mining and industry.49 
The Court in Cappaert and New Mexico gave no indication that the 
reasoning in those cases should apply to Indian reserved water rights. 
Indeed, scholars have noted that the narrow approach in New Mexico 
should be less applicable in the context of Indian reserved water 
rights because the Indian canons of construction require resolution of 
ambiguities in favor of tribes.50 Since Indian reserved water rights are 
usually based on a tribe’s reservation of water in treaties and 
executive orders, the quantification of these rights should be 
interpreted broadly in favor of tribes, the same way other ambiguities 
in treaties are interpreted under the Indian canons.51 Limiting water 
rights to the “minimal need” of an Indian reservation or applying a 
narrow reading of the “primary purpose” standard to Indian 
reservations would be contrary to these canons. 
Nevertheless, the “narrowing trend in the non-Indian reserved 
rights cases” has at times “infected the Indian reserved rights area 
with some uncertainty.”52 Some courts have been willing to extend 
the New Mexico and Cappaert precedent to Indian reserved water 
rights cases.53 In United States v. Adair, for example, the Ninth 
Circuit stated that New Mexico and Cappaert provide “useful 
guidelines” in analyzing a claim for Indian reserved water rights.54 
The Adair court adopted a similar standard to the Cappaert Court’s 
“minimal need” approach and determined that the tribe in that case 
was only entitled to enough water to support a “moderate living.”55 
 
48 438 U.S. at 701–02, 712, 718. Thus, water rights for “secondary” purposes of a 
federal reservation would have to be acquired under state law. Id. at 701. 
49 Id. at 701–02, 712, 718. 
50 See, e.g., Anderson, supra note 9, at 1151. 
51 See id. 
52 Robert T. Anderson, Indian Water Rights: Litigation and Settlements, 42 TULSA L. 
REV. 23, 26 (2006). 
53 See United States v. Adair, 723 F.2d 1394, 1408–09 (9th Cir. 1983). 
54 Id. at 1408. 
55 Id. at 1415 (extending Washington v. Wash. State Commercial Passenger Fishing 
Vessel Ass’n, 443 U.S. 658, 686 (1979)); see also Carvell, supra note 36, at 33 (discussing 
potential application of the “moderate living” standard in quantifying Indian reserved 
water rights). 
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Although the Arizona Supreme Court rejected application of the New 
Mexico primary purpose test to the Indian reserved water rights, it 
nevertheless applied other principles established in non-Indian 
reserved rights cases, such as the “minimal need” standard in 
Cappaert, to quantify Indian water rights.56 
In addition to tailoring a tribe’s water rights to its minimal need, 
the Arizona Supreme Court also rejected application of the PIA 
standard as a single-factor test.57 To effectuate a reservation’s 
purpose of providing a homeland for tribes, the court adopted a “more 
flexible analysis, which takes modern circumstances into account and 
permits courts in some cases to award less water than is demonstrated 
under the PIA measure.”58 The Arizona court’s approach 
demonstrates that state courts will often find ways to limit Indian 
water rights when the local economy is at risk.59 Still, at least one 
tribe has creatively used the Arizona court’s “homeland purpose” 
analysis to seek a larger water right than the PIA standard might have 
supported.60 The tribe argued that the court should “find sufficient 
water was reserved to provide for all domestic, agricultural, 
community, commercial, and industrial purposes.”61 
Although quantification remains the dominant source of 
uncertainty in Indian water law,62 other legal issues include whether 
Winters rights apply to groundwater and include a water quality 
component. At least one court concluded that the Winters doctrine 
does indeed apply to groundwater rights, but that a federal reserved 
groundwater right should only be recognized when surface water is 
insufficient to support the reservation’s need.63 Another court has 
determined that water rights generally, and therefore Indian reserved 
 
56 Gila River Sys. & Source, 35 P.3d 68, 77 & n.6, 80, 81 (Ariz. 2001). 
57 Id. at 79. 
58 Anderson, supra note 18, at 427; see Gila River Sys. & Source, 35 P.3d at 79–81. 
59 See Blumm et al., supra note 12, at 1158. 
60 United States v. Washington, 375 F. Supp. 2d 1050, 1062 (W.D. Wash. 2005), 
vacated pursuant to settlement sub nom. U.S. ex rel. Lummi Indian Nation v. Washington, 
No. C01-0047Z, 2007 WL 4190400 (W.D. Wash. Nov. 20, 2007). 
61 Id. 
62 See Anderson, supra note 9, at 1148–49. 
63 In re Gen. Adjudication of All Rights to Use Water in Gila River Sys. & Source, 989 
P.2d 739, 748 (Ariz. 1999); see also Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S. 128, 142–43 
(1976) (determining that a plaintiff could protect a federal reserved water right from harm 
due to groundwater withdrawals by obtaining an injunction preventing the withdrawals). 
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water rights, have an enforceable water quality component.64 
Accordingly, that court permitted a tribe to pursue an injunction 
against irrigation districts whose practices increased the normal 
salinity of river water, harming the tribe’s ability to irrigate and grow 
certain salt-sensitive crops.65 
In addition to Winters water rights, a tribe may have aboriginal 
water rights as the Ninth Circuit and the Washington Supreme Court 
recognized in Adair66 and Acquavella,67 respectively. In contrast to 
Winters rights, which have a priority date equal to the execution date 
of the treaty, executive order, statute, or agreement recognizing the 
reservation, aboriginal water rights have a priority date of time 
immemorial.68 Thus, while it is possible for some non-Indian water 
rights to have a priority date earlier than a treaty or similar agreement, 
aboriginal water rights predate all other rights, including other federal 
reserved rights. Aboriginal rights, however, may pose less of a threat 
to other water users because they are unlikely to constitute out-of-
stream, consumptive uses.69 Indeed, both the Adair and Acquavella 
courts recognized aboriginal water rights to support hunting and 
fishing.70 
A tribe’s entitlement to reserved or aboriginal water rights does 
not, however, guarantee that the tribe will be able to obtain the water 
or protect it from encroachment by other water users. Thus, tribes 
have at times invoked the federal trust duty to seek the federal 
government’s help in developing and enforcing their water rights. 
These efforts have yielded mixed results. 
 
64 See United States v. Gila Valley Irrigation Dist., 920 F. Supp. 1444, 1454–55 (D. 
Ariz. 1996), aff’d, 117 F.3d 425 (9th Cir. 1997). 
65 Id. 
66 United States v. Adair, 723 F.2d 1394, 1414 (9th Cir. 1983). 
67 Dep’t of Ecology v. Yakima Reservation Irrigation Dist., (Acquavella) 850 P.2d 
1306, 1310 (Wash. 1993). 
68 Adair, 723 F.2d at 1414; Yakima Reservation Irrigation Dist., 850 P.2d at 1310. 
69 Mike O’Hagan, Ciotti II - Better to Adjudicate than Litigate, 23 PUB. LAND & 
RESOURCES L. REV. 193, 198 (2002) (“Unlike Winters rights, Adair rights are generally 
nonconsumptive . . . .”). 
70 Adair, 723 F.2d at 1414; Yakima Reservation Irrigation Dist., 850 P.2d at 1310. 
Note, however, that some tribes, such as the Hohokam tribe in Central Arizona, 
prehistorically used large canal systems, thus making it possible that these tribes could 
claim significant aboriginal out-of-stream water rights for agricultural purposes. See, e.g., 
ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE AND HUMAN ADAPTATION IN THE ANCIENT AMERICAN 
SOUTHWEST 80 (David E. Doyel & Jeffrey S. Dean eds., 2006). 
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B. The Trust Duty in Relation to Water Rights 
Generally, “tribal water rights form part of the trust corpus 
protected by the federal-tribal trust relationship.”71 Indeed, in 
congressionally approved water right settlement acts, legislators 
commonly referred to water rights as “held in trust” for tribes.72 For 
example, the Western Water Policy Review Act of 1992 stated that 
“the Federal Government recognizes its trust responsibilities to 
protect Indian water rights and assist Tribes in the wise use of those 
resources.”73 The Department of the Interior has similarly 
acknowledged, in guidelines concerning Indian water rights 
settlements, that “Indian water rights are vested property rights for 
which the United States has a trust responsibility, with the United 
States holding legal title to such water in trust for the benefit of the 
Indians.”74 Cases also indicate that water rights are included in the 
trust relationship between the United States and the tribes.75 
Despite the government’s recognition of its trust responsibility 
with respect to tribal water rights, this responsibility is not always 
enforceable in an action for damages76 or for injunctive relief.77 For a 
federal trust duty to be enforceable in an action for damages, there 
must be “a comprehensive statutory/regulatory scheme giving the 
 
71 Judith V. Royster, Indian Water and the Federal Trust: Some Proposals for Federal 
Action, 46 NAT. RESOURCES J. 375, 375 (2006); see generally Erin B. Agee, Note, In the 
Federal Government We Trust? Federal Funding for Tribal Water Rights Settlements and 
the Taos Pueblo Indian Water Rights Settlement Act, 21 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 201, 
211–14 (2011). 
72 Royster, supra note 71, at 376 (citing Gila River Indian Community Water Rights 
Settlement Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-451, tit. II, § 204(a)(2), 118 Stat. 3478, 3502; 
Snake River Water Rights Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-447, div. J, tit. X, § 7(a)(1)(A), 
118 Stat. 2809, 3434; Confederated Tribes of the Warm Springs Reservation Water Rights 
Settlement Agreement, 1997, art. IV, § B, Pub. L. No. 107-102, § 2(a), 115 Stat. 974, 974). 
73 Reclamation Projects Authorization and Adjustment Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-
575, § 3002(9), 106 Stat. 4600, 4694 (codified by reference at 43 U.S.C. § 371 (2000)). 
74 Working Group in Indian Water Settlements; Criteria and Procedures for the 
Participation of the Federal Government in Negotiations for the Settlement of Indian 
Water Rights Claims, 55 Fed. Reg. 9223 (Dep’t of Interior Mar. 12, 1990). 
75 See Royster, supra note 71, at 376–77 (citing Fort Mojave Indian Tribe v. United 
States, 23 Cl. Ct. 417, 426 (1991) and Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe of Indians v. Morton, 
354 F. Supp. 252 (D.D.C. 1972)) (stating that “the government, as trustee, has a duty to 
preserve” tribal water rights). But see Grey v. United States, 21 Cl. Ct. 285 (1990), aff’d, 
935 F.2d 281 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (determining that government had no duty to help allottees 
deliver water to allotted lands). 
76 Royster, supra note 71, at 379. Note that a tribe may, however, recover damages for 
loss of water rights. Id. 
77 Shoshone Bannock Tribes v. Reno, 56 F.3d 1476, 1478 (D.C. Cir. 1995). 
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government full control, or a textual source establishing that the 
resources are held in trust, along with actual federal control of the 
resource.”78 Because “[t]here is no scheme imposing comprehensive 
duties on the Secretary of the Interior to manage tribal water,” some 
scholars have concluded that the government has only a “limited 
trust” relationship with tribes concerning management of tribal water 
rights.79 Further, even where a tribal water right exists, actual federal 
control over the resource is lacking because “the Government does 
not manage tribal water resources on a day-to-day basis.”80 Indeed, 
the claims court determined that the federal government has no duty 
to develop infrastructure to provide water to tribes.81 More recently, 
the Ninth Circuit denied injunctive relief to the Gros Ventre Tribe 
when it sued the federal government for breaching its trust duty by 
authorizing mining operations that would pollute water to which the 
Tribe held rights.82 Courts have, however, indicated that the federal 
government might be held liable for improperly diminishing tribal 
water rights if the representation was inadequate.83 Nevertheless, 
most cases and scholarship indicate that the federal trust duty is not an 
effective tool to compel the federal government to proactively protect 
or promote Indian access to water. Still, in the legislative arena, the 
 
78 Royster, supra note 71, at 379–80 (citing United States v. White Mountain Apache 
Tribe, 537 U.S. 465, 473–75 (2003); United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206, 224–25 
(1983)); see also United States v. Navajo Nation, 556 U.S. 287, 296–301 (2009); United 
States v. Navajo Nation, 537 U.S. 488, 503 (2003). 
79 Nell Jessup Newton, Indian Claims in the Courts of the Conqueror, 41 AM. U. L. 
REV. 753, 807 (1992). 
80 Id. 
81 Salt River Pima-Maricopa Indian Cmty. v. United States, 26 Cl. Ct. 201, 204 (1992) 
(“Due to the much higher level of control the Indians . . . exercise over their lands, no 
fiduciary obligation or trust relationship attaches with respect to the delivery of water to 
those lands.”); Grey v. United States, 21 Cl. Ct. 285, 293 (1990) (“[T]he General 
Allotment Act does not impose any duty on the Government to manage the water on each 
individual allotment.”). 
82 Gros Ventre Tribe v. United States, 469 F.3d 801, 803, 815 (9th Cir. 2006); see also 
Shoshone Bannock Tribes, 56 F.3d at 1478. 
83 See Arizona v. California, 460 U.S. 605, 628 n.20 (1983) (“[I]n an appropriate case 
the Tribes’ remedy for inadequate representation by the Government may lie in the Court 
of Claims.”), decision supplemented by 466 U.S. 144 (1984); In re Gen. Adjudication of 
All Rights to Use Water In Gila River Sys. & Source, 127 P.3d 882, 901 n.21 (Ariz. 2006). 
For a comprehensive discussion of the San Carlos Apache Tribe water rights litigation, see 
Daniel Lee, Statutes of Ill Repose and Threshold Canons of Construction: A Unified 
Approach to Ambiguity After San Carlos Apache Tribe v. United States, 36 SEATTLE U. L. 
REV. 1997 (2013) and Daniel Lee & Jacob J. Stender, An Unreserved Attack on Reserved 
Water Rights: The Story of the San Carlos Apache Tribe’s Water Rights (or Lack Thereof), 
1 AM. INDIAN L.J. 413 (2013). 
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government’s trust duty has provided a strong basis for favoring 
federal support of Indian water rights, including congressional 
funding of Indian water settlements.84 
II 
THE MULTILATERAL BENEFITS OF INDIAN WATER RIGHTS 
SETTLEMENTS 
States, tribes, private parties, and the federal government can all 
avoid much of the doctrinal confusion discussed in Part I by settling 
Indian water rights claims.85 First, parties can avoid the uncertainty of 
what quantification standard a court might apply to Indian water 
rights, be it the PIA standard, the homeland purpose test, or yet 
another standard. Even if a state has already chosen to adhere to the 
PIA standard or the homeland purpose test, settlement avoids the 
substantial uncertainty surrounding whether a court would determine 
that land is reasonably irrigable under the PIA standard, or how a 
court would apply the malleable factors of the homeland purpose test. 
Second, settlement avoids the uncertainty of whether a court would 
apply the Sensitivity Doctrine to limit a tribe’s water rights. Third, it 
avoids potential confusion over whether to follow the minimalist 
approach in Cappaert or the primary-purpose test in New Mexico. 
Finally, instead of relying on the limited precedent on the water 
quality component of reserved water rights and the application of the 
Winters doctrine to groundwater, settling parties can specifically 
address groundwater and water quality issues as a part of the 
settlement.86 
Reducing these legal uncertainties through settlement benefits all 
parties involved. While tribes avoid the possibility of a court taking a 
narrow approach to these issues, private parties and states avoid 
determinations of tribal water rights that substantially reduce the 
amount of water available to non-Indian parties. Other shared benefits 
of settlement include reducing the time and cost of litigation for all 
 
84 See Royster, supra note 71, at 375–76; Smith, supra note 8, at 5. 
85 See John B. Weldon, Jr. & Lisa M. McKnight, Future Indian Water Settlements in 
Arizona: The Race to the Bottom of the Waterhole?, 49 ARIZ. L. REV. 441, 449, 460 (2007) 
(discussing negotiated settlements that avoided the uncertainty of litigation). 
86 See Judith V. Royster, Indian Tribal Rights to Groundwater, 15 KAN. J.L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 489, 500–01 (2006) (“Of the twenty or so water settlement acts since 1978, more 
than half contain some provisions concerning tribal rights to groundwater.”); Judith V. 
Royster, A Primer on Indian Water Rights: More Questions Than Answers, 30 TULSA L.J. 
61, 85, 100 (1994) (discussing water quality). 
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parties, including the federal government, which has a trust 
responsibility to represent tribes in water adjudications.87 Without 
settlement, the costs of litigation and time delay can be substantial. 
For example, more than thirty years after Acquavella was filed and 
after numerous decisions by the Washington Supreme Court, there 
has still been no final decree for the Yakima River adjudication.88 
Settlements also provide a number of benefits that are unique to the 
different parties involved. Private parties and states may favor 
settlement because tribes are usually willing to reduce their claims in 
part or agree to lease tribal water rights for a period of time to 
nontribal entities in return for infrastructure funding.89 Thus, 
settlements often free up significant amounts of water for private 
users. Settlement can also provide federal approval of tribal water 
marketing, which protects the interests of municipalities that can then 
lease tribal water to satisfy the needs of growing communities.90 
Without a federally approved settlement, the Nonintercourse Act’s 
ban on real estate transactions between tribes and states could prevent 
a municipality from buying or leasing the rights.91 Thus, water 
marketing provides a “means of ensuring that water is put to the most 
economic and beneficial use.”92 
The federal government should also prefer settlement to litigation 
because waivers included in the settlement can shield the federal 
government from liability for a failure to fulfill treaty, statutory, or 
contractual duties. Although tribes have generally been unsuccessful 
in obtaining damages for the federal government’s failure to develop 
tribal water rights, the government’s improper diminishment of water 
rights remains an area of potential liability.93 A settlement provides 
the federal government an avenue to fulfill its obligations as a trustee 
 
87 See Indian Water Rights: Promoting the Negotiation and Implementation of Water 
Settlements in Indian Country: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Indian Affairs, 112th 
Cong. 1 (2012) [hereinafter Hearing], available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG  
-112shrg75973/pdf/CHRG-112shrg75973.pdf. 
88 Jeff Kray, Acquavella–Washington’s 36-Year Old Water Rights Adjudication Nears 
an End, MARTEN L. (Apr. 16, 2013), http://www.martenlaw.com/newsletter/20130416      
-acquavella-adjudication-near-end#sthash.GHu8V7a9.dpuf. 
89 Smith, supra note 8, at 2. 
90 Hearing, supra note 87, at 38, 41 (statement of Judith V. Royster, Professor/Co-
Director, Native American Law Center). 
91 25 U.S.C. § 177 (2006). 
92 Hearing, supra note 87, at 41 (statement of Judith V. Royster, Professor/Co-Director, 
Native American Law Center). 
93 See supra notes 81–83 and accompanying text. 
LEE (DO NOT DELETE) 5/15/2014  2:10 PM 
2014] A Century of Uncertainty and the New Politics of Indian Water Settlements: 639 
How Tribes and States Can Overcome the Chilling Effect of the PAYGO Act 
by funding or building infrastructure to provide tribes with the water 
to which they hold rights. 
Conversely, tribes benefit from settlements because settlements 
often provide for federal infrastructure funding and other 
authorizations, while even successful litigation would leave a tribe 
with nothing more than a “paper water right” that does not help the 
tribes physically secure water.94 Using the leverage of unquantified 
Winters rights in a settlement, tribes can convert paper rights into 
“wet” water rights by obtaining federal funding for water delivery 
systems.95 Tribes can also tailor settlements to their specific needs 
even when these needs would usually be outside the scope of 
litigation in a general adjudication.96 For example, tribes have used 
settlements to bypass a moratorium that the Secretary of the Interior 
placed on approval of tribal water codes in 1975.97 Additionally, 
tribes can use settlements to “facilitate agreements with neighboring 
private parties, create protections for tribal fisheries and wetlands, 
enact conservation measures for urban users, resolve co-existing non-
water issues, deliver cash for tribal development, and establish water 
banking provisions.”98 
Moreover, these settlements have intangible but significant benefits 
for all parties in that they foster collaboration, unlike the adversarial 
process of litigation.99 In the long history of abrogation, 
diminishment, and encroachment on tribal rights, this cooperation 
may be invaluable in reconciling states with tribes. Due to the new 
requirements of PAYGO, political cooperation is now more crucial 
than ever in achieving the common goal of obtaining congressional 
approval. 
 
94 See Agee, supra note 71, at 212 (citing FELIX S. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL 
INDIAN LAW § 19.05[2], at 1219 (Nell Jessup Newton et al. eds., 2005)). 
95 Hearing, supra note 87, at 40 (statement of Judith V. Royster, Professor/Co-Director, 
Native American Law Center). 
96 Id. at 41. 
97 Id.; Royster, supra note 71, at 383–84. The moratorium was implemented in 
anticipation of regulations that were never issued. Id. “At least six water rights settlement 
acts authorize or require the tribes to adopt water codes.” Id. at 383. 
98 Agee, supra note 71, at 212 (citing John E. Thorson et al., Dividing Western Waters: 
A Century of Adjudicating Rivers and Streams, Part II, 9 U. DENV. WATER L. REV. 299, 
407 (2006)). 
99 Hearing, supra note 87, at 26 (statement of Maria O’Brien, Legal Committee Chair, 
Western States Water Council). 
LEE (DO NOT DELETE) 5/15/2014  2:10 PM 
640 OREGON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 92, 625 
III 
INDIAN WATER SETTLEMENTS IN THE ERA OF PAYGO 
Despite the substantial benefits that Indian water settlements offer 
to all parties involved, they face significant obstacles in obtaining 
congressional approval. Section A below explains one of the largest 
obstacles for Indian water settlements: meeting PAYGO Act 
requirements that new legislation offset direct spending by 
diminishing other spending or otherwise increasing revenues. Section 
B explores one recent success story in the passage of the Claims 
Resolution Act of 2010, which included four Indian water 
settlements, garnered widespread political support, and met PAYGO 
requirements. 
A. Requirements of the PAYGO Act 
Without the significant incentive of federally funded water delivery 
systems, tribes may opt to forego settlement. The PAYGO Act makes 
it more difficult to obtain federal funding, thus threatening future 
Indian water settlements. The PAYGO Act100 requires that “any 
direct spending and revenue provisions in a bill not increase the 
federal deficit.”101 Direct spending “includes federal government 
spending on entitlement programs as well as other budget outlays 
controlled by laws other than appropriation acts.”102 Direct spending 
provisions automatically make funding available for the designated 
purpose and are not contingent on provision of the funding in an 
appropriations act.103 However, direct spending need not be 
accompanied by other spending reductions under PAYGO if the 
spending is designated as “emergency legislation.”104 
The PAYGO Act does not place the same limitations on legislation 
that “merely authorizes an appropriation” but “does not actually 
appropriate any funds.”105 After passing the initial authorization act, 
Congress may or may not provide for the funding in a later 
appropriations act.106 Appropriations acts are legislation that fund 
 
100 Pub. L. No. 111-139, 124 Stat. 8 (2010) (codified beginning at 2 U.S.C. § 931 and 
scattered sections thereafter). 
101 Smith, supra note 8, at 3. 
102 Id. (quoting D. ANDREW AUSTIN & MINDY LEVIT, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 
RL33074, MANDATORY SPENDING SINCE 1962, at 1 (2010)). 
103 Id. 
104 2 U.S.C. § 933(g) (2012). 
105 Smith, supra note 8, at 3. 
106 Id. 
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“routine activities commonly associated with such federal 
government functions as running executive branch agencies, 
congressional offices and agencies, and international operations of the 
government.”107 Because legislation that authorizes spending does 
not immediately appropriate funds, it essentially defers the necessity 
of meeting PAYGO requirements until Congress passes later 
appropriation acts and actually releases the funds.108 Nevertheless, 
political pressure may force legislators to offset authorization as well 
as direct spending at the time of a settlement’s passage, or forego both 
authorization and direct spending.109 Despite political pressure to 
offset authorization and the PAYGO Act’s requirements for offsetting 
direct spending, a number of tribes were able to obtain federal 
funding for Indian water settlements in the Claims Resolution Act of 
2010. 
B. One Success Story: The Claims Resolution Act of 2010 
In compliance with PAYGO requirements, Congress passed the 
Claims Resolution Act of 2010, which incorporated four Indian water 
rights settlements and two unrelated settlements, and included both 
direct spending and authorizations.110 To meet PAYGO requirements, 
Congress offset the direct spending by “(1) reduc[ing] [other] federal 
direct spending by approximately $4.9 billion from 2011-2020 by 
reforming the Unemployment Compensation Program; and (2) 
increas[ing] revenue to the US Treasury by approximately $2 billion 
by extending Customs Users Fees.”111 According to an estimate from 
the Congressional Budget Office, the Claims Resolution Act will 
actually “reduce the federal deficit by $1 million within the 10-year 
budget window notwithstanding the direct spending contained in the 
bill.”112 
Even with these offsets, it is possible that the Act would not have 
gone through but for a number of other factors. The inclusion of 
 
107 Id. (quoting D. ANDREW AUSTIN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL34424, TRENDS IN 
DISCRETIONARY SPENDING 1 (2009)). 
108 See 2 U.S.C. § 934(b) (requiring that the President consider budget debit only for 
the current year in enforcing PAYGO requirements). 
109 Smith, supra note 8, at 3. 
110 Claims Resolution Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111–291, 124 Stat. 3064. 
111 Smith, supra note 8, at 3. 
112 Id. To gain support from certain senators, the Claims Resolution Act was also 
changed to lower the authorization level for Indian water settlements in a 2008 Act that 
had “authorized $1 billion for congressionally approved Indian water settlements.” Id. 
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multiple water settlements gave the Act broad bipartisan support at its 
introduction because both states with Republican representatives and 
states with Democratic representatives stood to benefit from the 
federal funding.113 The water settlements were also attached to the 
large Cobell settlement concerning the United States’ 
mismanagement of Native American trust funds and settlement of the 
Pigford II discrimination lawsuit brought by African-American 
farmers.114 Although the Cobell and Pigford II settlements were 
similarly subject to PAYGO and therefore increased the amount of 
spending reductions needed to pass the legislation,115 these 
settlements added political momentum to the Act. Indeed, the Obama 
administration had already indicated that it would prioritize passage 
of these two settlements, especially the Cobell settlement.116 As one 
commentator noted, “[w]ithout the combination of factors discussed 
above, the package of water settlements would probably not have 
become law.”117 
The passage of the Claims Resolution Act of 2010 suggests that, in 
the wake of the PAYGO Act, tribes, states, and parties wishing to 
obtain federal approval of an Indian water rights settlement, in some 
circumstances, may gain an advantage by combining multiple 
settlements and high priority legislation into one act. Had the 
agreements in the 2010 Act been settled individually, they might have 
garnered less support because the benefits of individual settlements 
 
113 Id. The settlements included in the Claims Resolution Act were sponsored by the 
following representatives: 
Sen. Kyl (R-AZ), Sen. McCain (R-AZ), Rep. Kirkpatrick (D-AZ), Rep. Shadegg 
(R-AZ), Rep. Flake (R-AZ), Rep. Pastor (D-AZ), Rep. Grijalva (D-AZ), Rep. 
Giffords (D-AZ), Rep. Mitchell (D-AZ), and Rep. Franks (R-AZ) sponsored the 
White Mountain Apache Tribe’s water settlement; Sen. Tester (D-MT), Sen. 
Baucus (D-MT), and Rep. Rehberg (R-MT) sponsored the Crow settlement; and 
Sen. Bingaman (D-NM), Sen. Udall (D-NM), Rep. Lujan (D-NM), and Rep. 
Heinrich (D-NM) sponsored the Aamodt and Taos settlements. 
Id. 
114 Id. 
115 See CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, ESTIMATE OF THE STATUTORY PAY-AS-
YOU-GO EFFECTS FOR H.R. 4783, THE CLAIMS RESOLUTIONS ACT OF 2010, AS PASSED BY 
THE SENATE ON NOVEMBER 19, 2010 (2010), available at http://www.cbo.gov/sites 
/default/files/cbofiles/ftpdocs/119xx/doc11977/hr4783.pdf. One representative had 
proposed declaring the Pigford II settlement a national emergency, which would have 
brought the settlement within an exemption to the PAYGO Act. Black Farmers Call on 
Congress to Pay Racial Bias Settlement, CNN (Apr. 21, 2010, 6:14 PM), 
http://www.cnn.com/2010/POLITICS/04/21/black.farmers.lawsuit/index.html. 
116 Smith, supra note 8, at 3. 
117 Id. 
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accrue largely in one state. Although it may not be possible to 
duplicate the extremely favorable circumstances surrounding the 2010 
legislation, the three Indian water settlements that are currently 
pending in Congress may yet be able to leverage some of the 
strategies that led legislators to pass the Claims Resolution Act. 
IV 
PENDING INDIAN WATER SETTLEMENTS 
Since 2010, three additional Indian water settlements have been 
proposed to Congress. First, the State of Montana, the Gros Ventre 
and Assiniboine Tribes, and the United States have sought to settle 
Indian water rights to the Milk River that were previously reserved to 
support the Fort Belknap Reservation.118 Second, the State of 
Montana, the United States, and the Blackfeet Tribe are seeking to 
settle the Tribe’s rights to the St. Mary River.119 Bills containing 
these settlements have been referred to Senate and House committees, 
but neither has reached the Senate or House floor.120 Third, the State 
of Arizona, the United States, and the Navajo and Hopi Tribes have 
sought to settle the Tribes’ reserved rights to the Little Colorado 
River.121 However, this settlement failed to pass in the 112th 
Congress and has yet to be reintroduced in the 113th.122 
While the proposed Fort Belknap settlement contains slightly more 
than $310 million in mandatory federal funding and authorization for 
around $236 million,123 the proposed Blackfeet settlement includes 
authorization of at least $218 million,124 with the state providing 
another $20 million.125 The Navajo-Hopi settlement bill would have 
 
118 Gros Ventre and Assiniboine Tribes of the Fort Belknap Indian Community Water 
Rights Settlement Act of 2013, S. 1394, 113th Cong. (2013); see also MONT. CODE ANN. 
§ 85-20-1001 (West, Westlaw through the 2013 Sess.) (ratifying the Fort Belknap-
Montana compact in 2001). 
119 Blackfeet Water Rights Settlement Act of 2013, S. 434, 113th Cong. (2013). 
120 See id. 
121 Navajo-Hopi Little Colorado River Water Rights Settlement Act of 2012, S. 2109, 
112th Cong., § 104 (2012). 
122 See Bill Summary & Status, 112th Congress (2011–2012), S.2109, THOMAS, 
http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d112:s.02109: (last visited Dec. 31, 2013). 
123 S. 1394, 113th Cong. § 11(j).  
124 S. 434, 113th Cong. § 14(b), (c). 
125 Id. § 5(e), (d)(2)(E). Although the Fort Belknap settlement provides for a State 
contribution that focuses on amending the Milk River project to release sufficient water for 
the Tribe, the settlement otherwise provides only for funding requests that the Secretary 
may make to the State. S. 1394, 113th Cong. § 8(d)(1)(A). 
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authorized $358.7 million in federal funding.126 Although the 
proposed Navajo-Hopi settlement did not appropriate funds subject to 
PAYGO offset requirements, the waiver of the Tribes’ claims to 
water rights would have been contingent on actual provision of the 
funds.127 Thus, the settlement would have been effective only if 
Congress later passed an appropriation act allocating money for water 
infrastructure. 
Particularly, the Navajo-Hopi settlement bill faced unique 
challenges because the Navajo Tribe initially rejected the 
settlement.128 In July 2012, the Navajo Tribal Council “voted 15-6 
against the settlement,” putting a stop to congressional legislation, 
which required the approval of the Navajo and Hopi Tribes.129 The 
approval may have failed because “[c]ritics saw the settlement as an 
attack on their aboriginal rights and tilted toward corporate 
interests.”130 Opposition also stemmed from a provision in the bill 
allowing the Navajo Tribe to access Colorado River water if the Tribe 
extended a lease of its land for a coal power plant.131 Although the 
Hopi Tribe initially approved the settlement, the Tribe later withdrew 
its support.132 Gathering congressional support was especially 
unlikely after these rejections because the settlement required 
approval of both Tribes.133 Efforts by former Secretary of the Interior 
 
126 S. 2109, 112th Cong. § 104; STANLEY M. POLLACK, NAVAJO-HOPI LITTLE 
COLORADO RIVER WATER RIGHTS SETTLEMENT 15 (2012) (presented at the Oct. 8, 2012 
Law Seminars International: Tribal Rights, Sovereignty, & Economic Development in Las 
Vegas, NV) (on file with author). 
127 S. 2109, 112th Cong. § 105; POLLACK, supra note 126, at 15. 
128 Ryan Clark, Navajo Lawmakers Reject Proposed Water-Rights Settlement, TUCSON 
SENTINEL (July 5, 2012, 9:50 PM), http://www.tucsonsentinel.com/local/report/070512 
_navajo_water/navajo-lawmakers-reject-proposed-water-rights-settlement/. 
129 Felicia Fonseca, Navajo Council Rejects Water Rights Settlement, AZCENTRAL.COM 




132 Mekita Rivas, Hopi Withdraws Support of Water Rights Settlement, KGUN9 (Dec. 
28, 2012), http://www.jrn.com/kgun9/news/185033671.html. 
133 The Navajo’s failure to approve the settlement has given rise to intertribal tensions 
between the Navajo and Hopi. In a letter to Deputy Secretary of the Interior David Hayes, 
Hopi Tribal Chairman LeRoy Shingoitewa stated, 
[W]e are most gravely concerned about any implications that the right of the 
Hopi people to have clean and reliable water depends on the tender mercies of 
the Navajo Tribe toward the Hopi people. . . . We know of no other tribe in the 
country whose rights to water hinge upon, and may be held ransom by, the 
political machinations of another tribe. 
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Ken Salazar and Deputy Secretary of the Interior David Hayes to 
revive Navajo and Hopi leaders’ support for the settlement proved 
unsuccessful.134 
Prior to the bill’s failure, the Navajo Tribe’s attorney, Stanley M. 
Pollack, identified a number of factors in favor of approving the Little 
Colorado River settlement.135 The settlement would have ended over 
three decades of litigation concerning the Tribes’ water rights to the 
Little Colorado River.136 Additionally, it would have resolved 
disputes over groundwater rights, which would have otherwise posed 
a substantial challenge in litigation.137 Finally, the federal funding 
provided for in the settlement was geared toward meeting a basic 
human need for the Tribes—provision of drinking water.138 
Nevertheless, the factors against approval outweighed those in 
favor. First, the legislation was introduced prior to a final agreement 
between the Tribes and the State, and legislators were unmotivated to 
approve a settlement that did not already have the approval of the 
Tribes.139 Additionally, the settlement only addressed rights to the 
Little Colorado River, not the Tribes’ potentially more substantial 
claims to the larger Colorado River.140 Thus, legislators may prefer to 
wait for a more comprehensive settlement instead of piecemeal 
approval of multiple settlements. Finally, the settlement included anti-
marketing terms providing less flexibility in using and transferring 
 
Anne Minard, Interior Provides Latest Confusion in Little Colorado River Issue, 
INDIANCOUNTRYTODAYMEDIANETWORK.COM (Nov. 2, 2012), http://indiancountrytoday 
medianetwork.com/mobile/article/interior-provides-latest-confusion-in-little-colorado        
-river-issue-142218. 
134 Secretary of Interior Salazar Holds Water Rights Settlement Meeting with Navajo 
and Hopi Leaders, NAVAJO-HOPI OBSERVER (Nov. 20, 2012, 11:33 AM), http://www 
.navajohopiobserver.com/m/Articles.aspx?ArticleID=15023. 




139 Id. at 15. Although the Montana legislature has approved the Blackfeet settlement, 
the compact will only go up for the approval of the Tribe after congressional approval. 
Baucus, Tester Introduce Blackfeet Water Rights Settlement to Resolve Century-Old 
Conflict, Support Economic Growth, MAX BAUCUS (Feb. 23, 2011), http://www.baucus 
.senate.gov/?p=press_release&id=365. 
140 Pollack also notes that the Tribes’ waivers of rights are convoluted. POLLACK, supra 
note 126, at 15. This could pose an obstacle if it is unclear to legislators what the Tribes 
have waived under the settlement or at what point the waivers become effective. 
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some of the water.141 These terms could have prevented maximum 
beneficial use by denying growing cities the opportunity to lease the 
Tribes’ water surplus. 
In addition to Pollack’s factors, the circumstances that favored 
passage of the Claims Resolution Act of 2010 provide a useful 
standard by which to measure the likelihood of obtaining 
congressional funding and approval for pending settlements. At the 
outset, the 2010 settlements had the sponsorship and thus the political 
support of three states’ senators and representatives.142 In contrast to 
the 2010 Act, even if all of the three pending settlements had been 
consolidated into one act, only two states—Montana and Arizona—
would have had an incentive to pass the legislation because the 
Blackfeet and Fort Belknap settlements both concern Montana.143 
Still, future water settlements might not need the same breadth of 
support for congressional approval that the 2010 legislation had—
indeed, the 2010 Act passed with unanimous Senate approval.144 The 
pending settlements need only garner a simple majority in each house 
and the President’s signature to become law. 
Crucial to passage of the Claims Resolution Act of 2010 was the 
attachment of the Cobell settlement, which affected numerous tribes 
and thus gathered broader support across many states, as well as the 
support of the President. For the pending Montana water settlements, 
there is also some potential for attachment of trust duty settlements. In 
April 2012, the Obama administration announced its commitment “to 
resolve 41 long-standing disputes with Indian tribal governments over 
the federal mismanagement of trust funds and resources.”145 
 
141 Navajo-Hopi Little Colorado River Water Rights Settlement Act of 2012, S. 2109, 
112th Cong. § 106(e) (2012); POLLACK, supra note 126, at 15. 
142 Although four water settlements were at issue, two of them were in New Mexico. 
See supra note 113. While the Aamodt and Taos settlements were both sponsored by New 
Mexico congressmen, Arizona senators sponsored the White Mountain Apache settlement, 
and Montana senators sponsored the Crow settlement. Id. 
143 Although Congress’s fiscal ingenuity was a significant factor in addressing PAYGO 
requirements, determining the source of spending offsets for the pending settlements is 
beyond the scope of this article. It is worth noting, however, that even with the increase in 
federal revenue that accompanied the settlements, the 2010 settlements faced other 
substantial obstacles to their passage. 
144 Both House and Senate Pass Crow Settlement, BIG HORN COUNTRY NEWS (Dec. 2, 
2012), http://www.bighorncountynews.com/archive/2010/week%2048/story4.html. 
145 Rob Capriccioso, Obama Moves to Settle 41 Tribal Trust Cases for $1 Billion, 
INDIANCOUNTRYTODAYMEDIANETWORK.COM (Apr. 11, 2012), http://indiancountrytoday 
medianetwork.com/article/obama-moves-to-settle-41-tribal-trust-cases-for-$1-billion-107 
735. 
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According to Ignacia Moreno, Assistant Attorney General at the U.S. 
Department of Justice, “[these] settlements will amount to a combined 
total of $1.023 billion.”146 Notably, among these forty-one trust duty 
claim settlements is one involving the Assiniboine Tribe and another 
involving the Blackfeet Tribe.147 Thus, the Tribes could potentially 
leverage their trust duty claims to obtain congressional funding and 
approval for water rights settlements. Additionally, they could reach 
out to other tribes to create a coalition that would seek comprehensive 
legislation settling all or a large number of these trust duty claims 
along with the Tribes’ water rights. 
Most importantly, in pending settlements, tribes and states have at 
their disposal the same powerful arguments that inspired passage of 
the 2010 water settlements and many prior settlements. Both the 2010 
settlements and the pending water settlements focus on providing 
clean drinking water to tribes.148 There should be little debate that 
meeting this basic human need is a worthwhile use of federal funding 
and an important part of the federal government’s role as a trustee of 
tribes. Meeting PAYGO requirements should not stand in the way of 
provision of clean drinking water to tribes, especially when the 
federal government is receiving substantial value in return—namely, 
tribes’ waivers of claims for additional water and of potential breach-
of-trust claims against the United States. Finally, legislators could 
determine that the health implications for tribes that lack clean 
drinking water merit declaration of an emergency.149 Such a 
declaration would exempt the settlement legislation from PAYGO 





148 POLLACK, supra note 126, at 4; WHITE HOUSE, ACHIEVING A BRIGHTER FUTURE 
FOR TRIBAL NATIONS: 2011 WHITE HOUSE TRIBAL NATIONS CONFERENCE PROGRESS 
REPORT 14 (2011), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/2011whtnc 
_report.pdf. 
149 The PAYGO Act does not specify what circumstances are sufficient to merit 
emergency designation, but merely provides that “a provision shall be considered an 
emergency designation if it designates any item as an emergency requirement pursuant to 
this subsection.” 2 U.S.C. § 933(g)(3)(C) (2012). 
150 Id. 
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CONCLUSION 
Although new PAYGO requirements pose an obstacle to future 
Indian water settlements, the Claims Resolution Act of 2010 provides 
hope that legislators will continue to recognize the value of water 
settlements for tribes, states, private parties, and the federal 
government. It may be impossible to completely duplicate the 
favorable political circumstances that led to passage of the 2010 Act. 
However, states and tribes still have a number of powerful political 
mechanisms to advance settlements, along with strong legal, 
economic, political, and moral arguments. Legislators must also 
realize the inequity that results if settlement proposals fail due to 
PAYGO requirements when other tribes benefit from similar 
settlements simply because they settled their claims before PAYGO 
was enacted. 
Thus, Indian water settlements must not be viewed as isolated 
legislation advancing the goals of individual tribes, but as part of a 
larger movement toward (1) providing for the basic needs of tribes; 
(2) reconciling a long and unfortunate history of exploiting tribal 
resources; (3) promoting economic development for tribal, state, 
federal, and private constituencies; and (4) ending decades of water 
rights litigation and the uncertainty that such litigation spawns. A 
long-term congressional commitment to funding Indian water 
settlements will be a substantial step toward meeting these objectives. 
 
